Louisiana Law Review
Volume 14 | Number 1
The Work of the Louisiana Supreme Court for the
1952-1953 Term
December 1953

Civil Code and Related Subjects: Workmen's
Compensation
Wex S. Malone

Repository Citation
Wex S. Malone, Civil Code and Related Subjects: Workmen's Compensation, 14 La. L. Rev. (1953)
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.lsu.edu/lalrev/vol14/iss1/36

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews and Journals at LSU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Louisiana Law Review by an authorized editor of LSU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact kreed25@lsu.edu.

19531

WORK OF THE SUPREME COURT

tive lookout and failure to warn the driver of his excessive speed.
The Supreme Court stated the rule above that the guest may
rely upon the assumption that the driver will exercise proper
care and caution unless the danger is known or obvious to the
guest. It also felt that even if the latter were conceded to be
careless with respect to the speed maintained by the driver, this
speed was not a cause of the accident. There was a dissenting
opinion by Justice LeBlanc. He emphasized that driving conditions were abnormal at the time and the guest should have seen
to it that the ice was removed on his side of the windshield so
that he could assist the driver. If this position had prevailed, an
interesting question of last clear chance might have been interjected by the plaintiff, since at the time of the collision the driver
could see, while the guest was helpless in that respect.

WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION
Wex S. Malone*
CLAIMANTS, PREFERENCE AND EXCLUSION
The most important and widely discussed decision of the past
year on workmen's compensation is Caddo Contracting Co. v.
Johnson.' The Supreme Court gave a new perspective to the
matter of priorities between dependents. Many persons, including
the writer, had assumed that our compensation statute, wisely
or unwisely, set up a system of priorities for dependents so that
the existence of a widow or child who was entitled to compensation precluded any other dependent from successfully claiming
benefits under the act. Likewise the existence of a dependent
parent would seem to eliminate the claim of a brother or sister
of the deceased. This conclusion seemed inescapable from an
* Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. 222 La. 796, 64 So. 2d 177 (1953).
2. "(7) If there are neither widow, widower, nor child, then to the
father or mother, thirty-two and one-half per centum of wages of the
deceased. If there are both father and mother, sixty-five per centum of
wages.
"(8) If there are neither widow, widower, nor child, nor dependent parent entitled to compensation, then to one brother or sister, thirty-two and
one-half per centum of wages with eleven per centum additional for each
brother or sister in excess of one. If other dependents than those enumerated, thirty-two and one-half per centum of wages for one, and eleven
per centum additional for each such dependent in excess of one, subject
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examination of the language of R.S. 23:12322 and the decisions of
both the Supreme Court and the courts of appeal prior to 1948.3
The effect of the provision thus interpreted was often to confer a windfall on the employer or his insurer, who, relying upon
a small compensation payment to a child or parent, could be
relieved of any obligation to needy brothers, sisters, or other
dependents, even though the total of all claims asserted might
not exceed, or even equal, the maximum compensation with
which an employer can be charged.
Rumblings of dissatisfaction with this state of affairs became
evident in the opinions of the courts of appeal as early as 1944.
In Hamilton v. Consolidated Underwriters4 the Court of Appeal
for the Second Circuit denied that persons claiming as "other
dependent members of the family" 5 were to be excluded from
compensation because of the existence of a dependent mother.
The court relied upon the peculiar phraseology of the last sentence of R.S. 23:1232 (8) relating to this particular class of claimants. It then proceeded to allow compensation to brothers and
sisters of the deceased despite the existence of a dependent
mother. This result was achieved simply by classifying brothers
and sisters as "dependent members of the family."
The next case that urged a departure from the old position
was McDonald v. Louisiana, Arkansas and Texas Transportation
Co.6 Again the Court of Appeal for the Second Circuit allowed
compensation to dependent parents despite the existence of a
dependent child of the deceased. The attack this time was different from the one adopted in the Hamilton case. Instead of treating "dependent member of the family" as a special classification
not subject to deferment, the court concluded in general terms
that the existence of a member of a preferred group does not
serve to exclude other dependents. It found a general intention
by the Legislature that all dependents should share so long as
the maximum allowable compensation is not exceeded. This
intention was discovered from the terms of R.S. 23:1252, which
provides as follows:
to a maximum of sixty-five per centum of wages for all, regardless of the
number of dependents."
3. Bradley v. Swift & Co., 167 La. 249, 119 So.. 37 (1928); Brown v. WeberKing Lbr. Co., 7 La. App. 444 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1928); Dugas v. Gulf
States Utilities Co., 145 So. 376 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1933).
4. 21 So. 2d 432 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1944).
5. See La. R.S. 1950, 23:1253 in connection with La. R.S. 1950, 23:2343(8),
supra note 2.
6. 28 So. 2d 502 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1946).
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". If there are a sufficient number of persons wholly
dependent to take up the maximum compensation, the death
benefit shall be divided equally among them, and persons
partially dependent, if any, shall receive no part thereof."
The third case indicating that a new approach might be in
prospect was Patin v. T. L. James & Co.7 The question presented
was whether the existence of a partially dependent mother
should be a reason for denying compensation to an illegitimate
who was a "dependent member of the family." In holding for
the illegitimate the Court of Appeal for the First Circuit relied
8
entirely on the Hamilton case.
The Patin case went to the Supreme Court. That court, however, was apparently unwilling to accept the rationale of the
Hamilton case. Neither did it adopt the reasoning of the McDonald decision (which had not been mentioned in the hearing
before the court of appeal). Instead, the Supreme Court emphasized the fact that the mother was only partially dependent,
whereas the illegitimate child was wholly dependent upon the
deceased, and it restricted its holding to the proposition that
the existence of a partially dependent member of a preferred
group does not operate so as to deny compensation to a wholly
dependent member of a deferred group-an entirely new
approach to the problem. The question as to how to dispose of
the situation where both claimants are wholly dependent was
left in abeyance. The opinion, however, did serve warning that
somru notion akin to the one adopted in the McDonald case might
prevail if the question were squarely presented. It is noteworthy that in the cases discussed above the claims of all dependents could be satisfied in full without exceeding the maximum
compensation which can be assessed against the employer.
Thus the matter stood at the time of Caddo Contracting Co.
v. Johnson.9 In this case the deceased through artful deception
managed to maintain a legal wife on one side of the Red River
and a concubine and several illegitimate children on the other
side, with each family ignorant of the existence of the other.
All claimants were wholly dependent. The employer claimed
that the existence of the legal widow precluded any award of
compensation to the illegitimate children across the river. The
7. 218 La. 949, 51 So. 2d 586 (1951).
8. 42 So. 2d 304 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1949).

9. 222 La. 796, 64 So. 2d 177 (1953).
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Supreme Court held that all were entitled to compensation. The
reasoning of the opinion seems to be substantially the same as
in the McDonald case, but the court attempted to make the entire
pattern clear. It announced, first, that so long as the aggregate
of all claims of wholly dependent persons (irrespective of class)
do not exceed the maximum allowable compensation chargeable
to the employer, they should all be satisfied in full. Second, if
the fund available for compensation without exceeding these
limits (65 per cent of wages or 30 dollars weekly, whichever is
less) is not enough to satisfy in full the claims of all wholly
dependent persons, the deficiency must be borne by those wholly
dependent persons whose claims are subordinated by R.S. 23:
1232. In other words, preference as accorded by this provision of
the compensation act means only preferential treatment in the
event of a deficiency of available compensation.
The decision in the Johnson case and its rationale are analyzed elsewhere in the REvIEw. 10 Little can be added here except
by way of summary and conjecture as to the implications of the
decision for future litigation.
The situations that might arise can be meaningfully divided
into two groups: (1) where the claims of all recognized dependents can be satisfied in whole without imposing on the employer
a compensation obligation in excess of 65 per cent of earnings
at time of accident or in excess of 30 dollars weekly. When the
situation is thus, it is fair to assume that claims of both partially
and wholly dependent persons will be satisfied in full without
reference to any ranking or priority; (2) where the aggregate of
all claims will exceed the maximum compensation allowable
under the limitations above. In such a situation, some, or all
claimants must suffer a reduction in order to avoid exceeding
the maximum limitations. If it is borne in mind that claimants
are classified in the act both in terms of whole versus partial
dependency and in terms of preference because of family relationship or need, it is clear that several permutations are possible. These can be listed as follows:
A. All claimants totally dependent and all belonging to the
same preference class;
B. Some totally dependent claimants and some partially
dependent claimants, all belonging to the same preference class;
10. Noted infra p. 301.
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C. All claimants totally dependent, belonging to different
preference classes;
D. All claimants partially dependent, belonging to different
preference classes;
E. All totally dependent claimants belonging to one preference class, and one or more partial dependents belonging to a class which is inferior to that of the total
dependents;
F. All totally dependent claimants belonging to one preference class, and one or more partial dependents belonging to a class which is superiorto that of the total dependents.
Each of these situations, treated in the order set forth above,
deserves brief comment:
A. If all claimants are totally dependent and all belong to
the same preference class there is no basis for suggesting that
any one claimant should suffer a greater reduction than another
if the available fund is not sufficient to satisfy all. Therefore the
deficiency must be equally allocated among them. Even here,
however, our jurisprudence permits a variation in the case of a
widow and three or more children who are not living together.
In such a case the widow is entitled to her 32% per cent of earnings without reduction, while the children must divide the
remaining 32Y2 per cent between themselves.1 '
B. Where there are both total and partial dependents of the
same preference class, any deficiency must be absorbed by the
partial dependents exclusively. This is expressly provided in
R.S. 23: 1252.
C. The situation where all claimants are wholly dependent
but some of them are in an inferior preference group or classification was the picture before the Supreme Court in the Johnson
case. The opinion makes clear that the claims of wholly dependent persons in a preferred classification must be met in full
before the claims of deferred wholly dependents can be recognized and that any deficiency must be borne by the latter. This,
11. Selser v. Bragmans Bluff Lbr. Co., 146 So. 690 (La. App. Orl. 1933);
Britt v. Nashville Bridge Co., 171 So. 493 (La. App. 2d Cir 1937); American
Mutual Liab. Ins. Co. v. Sanders, 177 So. 498 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1937); Smith v.
Tangipahoa Par. School Board, 21 So. 2d 77 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1945). But cf.

Ocean Accident & Guarantee Corp. v. Stuart, 92 F. Supp. 225 (D. C. La.
1950).
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according to the court, is the very purpose for the inclusion of
R.S. 23:1232 in the statute.
D. If all claimants are partially dependent, but are members
of different preference groups, it would seem that by analogy
to situation C the members of the superior group should be preferred in the event of a shortage of available compensation.
E. The case of the deferred partial dependent is clear where
there are wholly dependent persons in a superior classification.
For the reasons stated in both B and C above it is obvious that
the claim of the partial dependent cannot be recognized except
from a residue that may remain after preferred claims have been
satisfied in full.
F. Where the partial dependent is a member of a preferred
or superior class and the remaining claimants are of an inferior
class, but are wholly dependent, the problem is difficult. Several
inferences from the McDonald and Johnson cases are possible:
on the one hand it can be argued that the court intended broadly
that the classification of inferior and superior dependents established by R.S. 23:1232 should be determinative whenever the
maximum available compensation will not satisfy all claims in
full. Under this approach the claim of even a partially dependent member of a superior class would be given preference over
the claim of a wholly dependent member of an inferior class in
the event of a shortage of available compensation. On the other
hand, it can be argued that the court's conclusion in the Johnson
case rests upon the premise that the preference of wholly dependent claimants over partially dependent claimants, as set forth
in R.S. 23:1252, represents the dominant purpose of the Legislature and thus afforded justification in the Johnson case for
depriving the provisions of R.S. 23:1232 of their apparent exclusionary effect. If this approach is correct, the claims of the
wholly dependent members of an inferior classification must
prevail in the event of an insufficiency of funds to meet all claims
in full.
ATTEMPTED RESCUE BY EMPLOYEE

An act of rescue by an employee during the course of his
work on his employer's premises involves a risk which arises out
of his employment, and compensation will be granted for injury
occasioned thereby. This liberal position was adopted by the
Supreme Court last year in the case, Edwards v. Louisiana For-
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estry Commission.- Claimant, a fire tower man employed by the
Forestry Commission, saw a child under attack by a vicious dog
on his employer's premises at a time when the claimant was
engaged in his duties atop a fire tower. In his haste to descend
the stair to effect a rescue he suffered a strain which resulted in
a hernia.
The opinion is a lengthy one which cites many cases from
other jurisdictions and a considerable array of periodical literature. It quotes approvingly from the recent opinion of the
United States Supreme Court in O'Leary v. Brown-Pacific-Maxon,
Incorporated3 wherein the observation was made that "workmen's compensation is not confined by common law conceptions
of scope of employment."'14 Following the same opinion, the Louisiana court quotes approvingly, "The test of recovery is not a
causal relation between the nature of employment of the injured
person and the accident .... Nor is it necessary that the employee
be engaged at the time of the injury in activity of benefit to his
employer. All that is required is that the 'obligations or conditions' of employment create the 'zone of special danger' out of
which the injury arose .... A reasonable rescue attempt ... may
be 'one of the risks of the employment, an incident of the service,
forseeable, if not foreseen, and so covered by the statute.',5
The chief contribution of the opinion, however, is the sage
recognition of the worker's right to compensation protection in
doing the natural and humane thing when confronted with a
sudden and unexpected situation. This is true even though the
emergency does not involve the safety of a fellow worker or the
employer's property, and even though it is not likely that the
situation giving rise to the rescue could involve liability for the
employer.
WORK WHICH IS A PART OF THE EMPLOYER'S BUSINESS
The compensation act protects only employees whose employment is in the course of their employer's trade, business or
occupation." The scope of this limitation has been debated many
times with reference to workers who were hired to construct,
remodel, or repair capital structures of their employer. The
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.

221
340
Id.
Id.
La.

La. 818, 60 So. 2d 449 (1952).
U.S. 504 (1951).
at 506.
at 507.
R.S. 1950, 23:1035.
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initial position of the court was that such work is not part of the
employer's trade, business or occupation unless the latter was
engaged in the construction business.1" This attitude prevailed
even with respect to building and loan companies, who frequently
maintain regular crews of workmen to preserve property in
which they are financially interested.18
Beginning in 1936 there developed a line of decisions in the
courts of appeal holding that where the business of the employer
is a hazardous one, repairs and similar work on capital structures
will be regarded as part of the business of the employer. 19 This
would not be true where the business is not hazardous independent of construction or repair work (although such work is, of
course, specifically classified as hazardous in the act) .20 Recently
the Supreme Court has approved this line of decisions in Speed v.
Page.21 In that case claimant was injured while engaged in
demolition and construction work for the defendant who was
rebuilding his motion picture theater which had been destroyed
by fire.
The position adopted in Speed v. Page represents a forward
step in keeping with the purposes of the compensation statute.
One may doubt, however, that the insistence that the business
be hazardous without respect to the construction work is either
a logical or wise limitation. Under this position the proprietor
of a livery stable or a restaurant would not be liable in compensation to those of his workers who undertake to repair his
establishment, while under similar circumstances the proprietor
of a garage or motion picture establishment would be subject
to liability. Perhaps it can be argued that this position is inherently fair because the livery stable proprietor is not liable for
compensation in the conduct of his regular business, while the
proprietor of the garage is so liable. Thus the announced principle does not serve to bring any new businesses under the
coverage of the statute, and it merely expands the scope of cover17. Shipp v. Bordelon, 152 La. 795, 94 So. 399 (1922); Wilkie v. Langlois, 164 So. 434 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1935); Lay v. Pugh, 119 So. 456 (La. App.
1st Cir. 1928).
18. White v. Equitable Real Estate Co., 139 So. 45 (La. App. Orl. 1932);

McAllister v. Peoples Homestead & Savings Association, 171 So. 130 (La.
App. 2d Cir. 1936).
19. Hecker v. Betz, 172 So. 816 (La. App. Orl. 1937); Gonsoulin v. Southern
Amusement Company, 32 So. 2d 94 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1947).

20. "Work in any of the building or metal trades in the erection, construction, extension, decoration, alteration, repair or demolition of any
building or structural appurtenances." La. R.S. 1950, 23:1035.
21. Speed v. Page, 222 La. 529, 62 So. 2d 824 (1952).
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age for businesses which are already affected. This argument
would be persuasive if it were true that certain businesses are
definitely within the protection of the act, while others are with
equal certainty not protected. In truth, however, there are few
businesses, however small and rudimentary their operations may
be, which do not lie within the fringe of compensation coverage.
A business management that would forego compensation insurance protection on the assumption that its operations were wholly
non hazardous would be rash indeed. Thus the distinction drawn
is not likely to be of much practical benefit, and it will probably
result in further confusion and litigation.
EMPLOYER'S RIGHT AGAINST TIRD PERSON

Although an illegitimate child is not entitled to maintain a
tort action under the provisions of Article 2315 of the Civil Code
for the death of its parent,2' 2 yet the illegitimate is entitled to
workmen's compensation from the parent's employer in the event
of the parent's death.23 This inconsistency between the two statutes is highlighted where the employer pays compensation to the
illegitimate and then seeks to recoup his loss by a suit against
the third party wrongdoer pursuant to Section 7 of the compensation statute. Such was the situation presented in the recent
case, Board of Commissioners of Port of New Orleans v. City of
New Orleans.2 4 The Supreme Court allowed the employer's claim
against the third party and dismissed the latter's exception of no
cause of action. The court characterized the employer's suit under
Section 7 as the exercise of a separate right of action rather than
a claim based upon principles of subrogation. The compensation
statute, said the court, vests in the employer a part of the liability
of the tortfeasor sufficient to warrant indemnification to the
former for the compensation he has paid. It then observed that
death does not extinguish the cause of action which accrued
when the employee was injured. This cause of action merely
passes to anyone who is specifically granted the privilege of
enforcing it. The employer, who is expressly authorized to sue
by Section 7 of the compensation statute, is such a person.
22. Youchican v. Texas & Pacific Ry. Co., 147 La. 1080, 86 So. 551 (1920);
Green v. New Orleans, S. & G. I. R. Co., 141 La. 120, 74 So. 717 (1917);
Thompson v. Vestal Lumber & Mfg. Co., 208 La. 83, 22 So. 2d 842 (1945);
Brown v. Texas & P. Ry. Co., 138 So. 221, 18 La. App. 656 (1931).
23. Thompson v. Vestal Lbr. & Mfg. Co., 208 La. 83, 22 So. 2d 842 (1945);
Williams v. Jahncke Service, Inc., 55 So. 2d 668 (La. App. Orl. 1951).
24. Board of Com'rs of Port of New Orleans v. New Orleans By and
Through Public Belt R. Commission, 223 La. 199, 65 So. 2d 313 (1953).

LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW

(VOL. XIV

The settled rule in Louisiana is that an employee of a subcontractor cannot pursue a tort claim for damages against the
negligent principal contractor, since the latter is not a third per25
son within the meaning of Section 7 of the compensation statute.
The Supreme Court has recently held that under such circumstances the sub-contractor who has paid compensation to his
employee cannot recover from the principal contractor under
Section 7 (2) of the act. 26 The sub-contractor, relying upon
Foster and Glassell Company v. Knight Brothers27 insisted that
his rights against the principal arise, not only from Section 7 of
the statute, but by way of a claim for indemnification as well.
The answer of the court was that one who is primarily liable for
compensation (which includes the sub-contractor under Section
6 of the act) cannot have indemnity from a person who is only
secondarily liable (the principal contractor under Section 6 of
the act). The position of the court is also justifiable from practical considerations. The principal contractor has presumably
paid the premium for the sub-contractor's compensation insurance as a part of the price for the contracted work. Therefore,
he should not later be called upon to shoulder the compensation
obligation of the sub-contractor's insurer under circumstances
where he could not have been made answerable in tort to the
injured employee.
EMPLOYER'S DEFENSES

In a suit for compensation the employer is allowed to show
as a defense that the employee deliberately failed to use an ade28
quate guard or protection against accident provided for him.
This defense was asserted in Herring v. Hercules Powder Company25 against a claim for compensation by the dependents of an
employee who was killed when the truck and trailer he was
driving was struck by a train at a crossing. The truck was provided with an air brake, but the deceased had knowingly neglected to attach it because his experience had shown that it
became easily disconnected when the truck moved along rough
25. Thibodaux v. Sun Oil Co., 218 La. 453, 49 So. 2d 852 (1950); Gaiennie
Co., Ltd. v. John 0. Chisoln, 3 La. App. 358 (Orl. 1926); Dandridge v.
Fidelity & Gas Co. of N.Y., 192 So. 887 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1939); Isthmian

S.S. Co. of Delaware v. Olivieri, 202 F. 2d 492 (5th Cir. 1953).

26. Coal Operators Gas Co. v. Fidelity & Casualty Co. of New York, 66
So. 2d 852 (La. 1953).

27. 152 La. 596, 93 So. 913 (1922).
28. La. R.S. 1950, 23:1081.

29. Herring v. Hercules Powder Co., 222 La. 162, 62 So. 2d 260 (1952).
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roads. The Supreme Court held that the defense had not been
established. The employer failed to sustain the burden of showing that connecting the brake would have avoided the accident.
The opinion also cast some light on the controversy as to what
constitutes "deliberate failure" to use a safety device. It indicated that where there is a good reason for not using the guard
or device the failure is not deliberate. This, in general, accords
with the approach which had been taken in several earlier cases
of the courts of appeal-that mere intentional rejection of a
safety device does not per se constitute the deliberate action contemplated by the statute.3 0
WAGE BASIS OF COMPENSATION PAYMENTS

The basis for computing compensation, announced in the
landmark case, Rylander v. T. Smith and Son, 31 is the daily rate
of pay multiplied by the number of days in a full work week.
This holds true even though it is conceded that the employee
worked only irregularly, for compensation is based upon loss of
earning capacity, rather than on actual loss of pay. This position
was reaffirmed recently in Troquille v. Lacaze's Estate.32 The
claimant had worked irregularly for defendant for a substantial
period of time when he was injured. The court of appeal had
computed compensation on the basis of his average weekly earnings for the preceding year. This was reversed on appeal, and
the test announced above was substituted.
DISABILITY

There were no significant decisions in the Supreme Court
dealing with the subject of disability. The court affirmed the position that an employee is totally disabled when an injury deprives
him of the ability to do work of the same character as that done
at the time of the accident. In Edwards v. Louisiana Forestry
Commission3 a tower man who sustained a hernia which entirely
prevented climbing and forced him to resign his job was regarded
as totally disabled.
30. McClendon v. Louisiana Cent. Lbr. Co., 135 So. 754 (La. App. 2d
Cir. 1931); Cole v. List Weatherly Const. Co., 156 So. 88 (La. App. 2d Cir.
1934).
31. 177 La. 716, 149 So. 434 (1933).
32. Troquille v. Lacaze's Estate, 222 La. 611, 63 So. 2d 139 (1953).
33. Edwards v. Louisiana Forestry Commission, 221 La. 818, 60 So. 2d
449 (1952) (rehearing 1952).
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In another case 34 the court announced that where partial disability was conceded it was improper to deny compensation on
the ground that the difference between the wage earned before
the accident and the earnings thereafter was too insignificant to
be a proper measure of loss of earning capacity. In such a case,
observed the court, the minimum compensation of three dollars
weekly should be awarded.

Civil Procedure
Henry G. McMahon*
THE PETITION

The late Judge Westerfield is reputed to have reminded
counsel, after reading the prayer for damages on a palpably
inflated claim, that the Biblical injunction "Ask and ye shall
receive" had no application to such worldly matters as damage
suits. Friedman Iron & Supply Co. v. J. B. Beaird Co.' presented
the converse of this situation, where the plaintiff failed to pray
for as much damages as it proved it had sustained as the result
of defendant's breach of a contract to purchase scrap steel. The
facts of the case are somewhat involved and, as they are discussed in another section of this symposium,2 need not be re-

peated here. For present purposes it suffices to point out that
originally plaintiff prayed for $12,500 damages, then in a supplemental petition claimed only $6,300, and finally on the trial
proved it had sustained damages of $8,622.40. In its final decision,
rendered after two rehearings had been granted, and with two
justices dissenting on other grounds, the Supreme Court limited
the recovery of damages to the $6,300 prayed for in the amended
petition.
McCarthy v. Osborn3 provides further evidence of a commendable attitude on the part of Louisiana's highest court to
have lawsuits decided on their merits, rather than on procedural
34. Blanchard v. Pittsburgh-Des Moines Steel Co., 66 So. 2d 342 (La.
1953).
* Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. 222 La. 627, 63 So. 2d 144 (1952).
2. Supra p. 145.
3. 223 La. 305, 65 So. 2d 776 (1953).

